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SUMMARY
THE CORRUPTION OF THE CLASS ACTION: THE
NEW TECHNOLOGY OF COLLUSION
John C. Coffee, Jr. t
Professor Coffee's article, an oral version of which was given at the
Cornell Mass Torts conference, is appearing in the Columbia Law
Review. However, because commentators in this volume have re-
sponded to it, he has authorized the following summary of his views.
Professor Coffee argues that recent developments in the mass tort
class action reveal an impending and historic shift in the function of
the class action: Once a sword for plaintiffs, it is becoming a shield for
defendants. Until recently, the class action primarily served as a vehi-
cle by which plaintiffs could aggregate claims of low to moderate
value, which could not be asserted in an economically feasible manner
on an individual basis, into a larger collective action, thereby gaining
leverage over defendants. Today, however, it is increasingly the cor-
porate defendant that wishes to be sued in a class action and-with
the help of a friendly plaintiffs' attorney-that often actively arranges
for such a suit to be brought by a nominal plaintiff. The procedures
by which such a collusive action can be implemented are relatively
new and represent for defendants a major development in legal tech-
nology that may allow them in the future to escape or minimize their
liability for most mass torts.
The new pattern is most evident in the mass tort area for several
basic reasons: (1) many mass tort victims are able to bring economi-
cally viable individual actions (and many are sufficiently high stakes
plaintiffs that they would opt out of any class action-provided that
the law permitted them to do so); (2) increasingly during the 1980s,
mass tort claims threatened public corporations with bankruptcy (and
actually bankrupted A.H. Robins, Johns Manville, National Gypsum,
and others, who but for their tort liabilities would have escaped bank-
ruptcy); and (3) particularly in the case of asbestos, mass tort claims
began to cast a longer and longer shadow on the federal docket. Fear-
ing that mass tort claims could bankrupt their corporations and
t John C. Coffee,Jr. is the Adolph Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University Law
School. Professor Coffee testified as an expert witness for objectors in Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), but did so on a pro bono basis.
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swamp their dockets, both defendants and federal judges began to
look for a mechanism by which to reduce the impact of such
litigation.
Rather than resist class action certification, defendants changed
their tactics and began to seek provisional certification (for "settle-
ment purposes only") because they discovered this technique could
assure low cost settlements. Historically, collusive settlements in class
actions were effected by plaintiffs' attorneys exchanging a low recov-
ery for a high attorneys' fee from the defendants.' However, this tech-
nique was at least potentially susceptible to judicial control-because
even when the court approved the settlement, it could still reduce the
fee award. The new technique that has developed in mass tort cases,
however, largely outflanks the (limited) effectiveness ofjudicial over-
sight through control over the fee award. Defendants can offer plain-
tiffs' attorneys a global settlement by which they agree to settle the
plaintiffs' attorneys' entire inventory of existing cases at the prevailing
market rate for such claims if the same attorneys will agree to bring
and settle a class action on behalf of other (largely future) claimants
on a less favorable basis. Uniquely, such an inventory settlement is
possible in the mass tort field where the plaintiffs' attorney is likely to
be a specialized practitioner handling a large volume of a specific cat-
egory of personal injury claims (asbestos cases, for example), usually
on a referral basis. 2
Professor Coffee examines several recent examples where such an
inventory settlement of existing cases has accompanied (and some-
times been clearly linked to) a class action settlement on behalf of
future claimants. He predicts that the defense bar is now broadly
adopting and generalizing this approach, which will be widely fol-
lowed in the future to the detriment of injured tort victims unless re-
forms are introduced.
In his critique of current practices, Professor Coffee focuses on
three specific targets:
1 For reviews of the limited success of courts in dealing with this problem, see John
C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plainto's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 CoLuM. L. RE:v. 669
(1986); Jonathan K. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Refomn, 58 U. Cur. L. REv.
1 (1991).
2 In contrast, plaintiffs' attorneys in the securities or corporate field lack any such
clientele of individual cases and so cannot be offered an inventory settlement.
852 [Vol. 80:851
CLASS ACTION
1. The "Settlement Class Action"
Until recently, courts did not permit a settlement of a class action
until after the court "certified" the class and selected lead counsel.3
Often, there was a considerable struggle within the plaintiffs' camp
surrounding the selection of lead counsel. At least potentially, this
contest both maximized the court's discretionary control over the case
and reduced (marginally) the possibility of a quiet collusive settle-
ment. Yet in a "settlement class action," plaintiffs' lawyers and defend-
ants typically negotiate a settlement prior to filing the-class action, and
the class action is certified for purposes of settlement only. Not only
do the plaintiffs' attorneys abandon the right to litigation at the outset
(which assures defendants that there is little downside risk from the
use of this approach), but there is little opportunity for judicial over-
sight or intervention by other plaintiffs' attorneys.
This was the pattern in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,4 where,
after many months of private negotiation and prior to the filing of the
class action, a consortium of twenty major asbestos producers reached
a global settlement covering all future asbestos personal injury claims
with just two plaintiffs' law firms. The complaint, the answer, and the
settlement were all filed on the same day. Although the two plaintiffs'
law firms had earlier served on a nationwide steering committee of
plaintiffs' attorneys, the majority of this committee had rejected a set-
tlement with the same defendants.
Professor Coffee argues that the critical problem with settlement
class actions is that they permit the defendants to choose the plain-
tiffs' attorneys. Even when no discernible side payment is offered to
the plaintiffs' attorneys, defendants can effectively conduct a reverse
auction among plaintiffs' attorneys, seeking the lowest bidder from
the large population of plaintiffs' attorneys. Because each attorney
knows that there are other attorneys to whom the defendant can make
the same offer, and because ultimately the most cooperative plaintiffs'
attorney (that is, the lowest bidder) will win, plaintiffs' attorneys are
pressured to accept settlements on terms favorable to the defendants.
In effect, defendants confer a valuable property right on the "friendli-
est" plaintiffs' attorney: the right to represent a very large class of
plaintiffs (mostly future claimants) that the attorney does not cur-
rently represent. This valuable right plus the linked ability to settle on
a superior basis all the cases in the attorney's existing inventory
3 The original Manual for Complex Litigation strongly discouraged settlement negotia-
tions prior to certification. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.46, at 60-61 (1977).
For early, but equivocal,judicial evaluations, see Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 155 n.3 (3d
Cir. 1975); Greenfield v. Yillager Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 826 (3d Cir. 1973).
4 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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(which cases might not otherwise be resolved for years) represents the
inducement for reaching a weak settlement.
Although courts historically viewed "settlement class actions"
skeptically (and indeed mass tort class actions were themselves rarely
certified at all until recently),judicial attitudes changed sharply in the
late 1980s, as the federal judiciary searched for some means by which
to protect itself from an inundation of individual mass tort cases.
Although class actions provisionally certified "for purposes of settle-
ment only" have now become common (in the asbestos field, breast
implants, and defective product cases), the critical fact about these
cases is that the dominant interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23 would probably prevent the same class action from being
certified for purposes of trial.5 The doctrinal problem is the "com-
monality" requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a),
which some circuits believe cannot be satisfied in mass tort class ac-
tions for personal injuries.6 The consequence, however, is a profound
imbalance that denies even well-meaning plaintiffs' attorneys any lev-
erage in settlement negotiations. Put simply, plaintiffs' attorneys in
such a setting have only a limited franchise: they can settle, but not
fight. Given these constraints, they are effectively negotiating with at
least one arm tied behind their backs. Indeed, when the class action
cannot be brought to trial, the most logical reason for defendants to
settle is that they believe that "a settlement class action" is cheaper
than a continuing stream of individual actions. Under these circum-
stances, the class action becomes the defendants' weapon.
2. "Future Claims"
A unique characteristic of recent mass tort class actions has been
their deliberately narrow definition of the class so as to include only
those persons who had not yet filed a lawsuit on the date the class
action was filed. This practice of sharply separating present from fu-
ture claims both reflects the desire of counsel (on both sides) to
purge from the class any present claimants (who have both the incen-
tive and ability in "high stakes" cases to monitor their attorneys) and
5 In Georgine v. Amchem Products Inc., the defendants asserted that the class could not
be certified for litigation purposes, but only for settlement purposes. The doctrinal ration-
ale for this position is that the plaintiffs have a "common interest" in the settlement, even if
the factual circumstances surrounding their injuries (or the causation thereof) do not
present sufficiently common questions of law or fact to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23. The district court accepted this position, finding that the class members "all share
an interest in receiving prompt and fair compensation" and that the settlement's adequacy
"is a predominant issue for the purpose of Rule 23(b) (3)." Geogine, 157 F.R.D. at 316; see
also Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.RID. 141, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
6 For recent cases reversing attempts to certify a "hostile" mass tort class action for
personal injuries, see In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); In re
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
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the defendants' primary desire, given the long latency period (possi-
bly extending for decades) in mass tort cases, to obtain litigation clo-
sure so that plaintiffs' recoveries will not continue to spiral upward.
If the defendant corporation waits until these injuries actually de-
velop, the asbestos experience has taught them that an aggressive
plaintiffs' bar will continue to obtain very costly individual verdicts,
possibly including punitive damages. However, because only a small
percentage of those exposed to the dangerous product or toxin will
develop injury, defendants can anticipate that these prospective vic-
tims will take little action to protect their claims from an unfairly
cheap compromise before they develop the first signs or symptoms of
injury. As a result, when a mass torts class action is defined primarily
to encompass future claimants, defendants can expect "rational apa-
thy" on the part of most class members, who have little incentive to
protect themselves (and no reason to opt out with regard to injuries
they have not yet experienced). This, in turn, sets the stage for a col-
lusive settlement.
Current experience suggests that the beneficiaries of the "future
claims" class action are: (1) defendants, who cap and limit their liabil-
ity; (2) courts, which escape the prospect of a high volume of individ-
ual claims crowding their dockets; and (3) the plaintiffs' attorneys
selected by defendants as class counsel, who are generously paid for
their willingness to settle the claims of persons who have never sought
to be represented by them.
3. "Opt-Outs"
In some recent class actions, individual plaintiffs have been de-
nied the right to "opt out." When such a right exists, individual plain-
tiffs often exercise it in large numbers (as happened in the silicone
breast implants settlement).7 Some courts are now denying plaintiffs
any right to opt out, making a class action lawsuit mandatory in order
to avoid depletion of a "limited fund."8 Procedurally, this "limited
7 In the breast implants litigation, about 250,000 persons opted out of the class, giv-
ing rise to assertions that the settlement might founder because the defendants might
exercise their right of withdrawal. See Georgine, 157 F.RD. at 325 (Reed, J., rejecting this
contention).
8 SeeAhearn v. Fibreboard Corp., Order Provisionally Certifying Class for Settlement
Purposes, No. 93-526 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 1993) (certifying non-opt-out limited fund class).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (1) (B), the court may find that "adjudications
with respect to individual members of the class... would as a practical matter be disposi-
tive of the other members... or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests." Where overhanging tort liabilities threaten a corporation with insolvency (or
where the corporation's insurance policy is its principal asset and may prove inadequate to
cover all liabilities), some courts have certified a "limited fund" class action under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (1) (B) on the rationale that later creditors would not be paid
unless all claims are pooled and a prorated recovery paid to all. In the past, such attempts
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fund" rationale for denying opt-outs has been implemented by treat-
ing the corporuation's insur1ntceL poli as ,,,ed i ,ti .,L,LVl u.,LL-Iu. .ep r-
lem with this rationale is that it permits opportunistic behavior by the
corporate debtor, which can scale down its tort liabilities and avert
bankruptcy. In contrast, in bankruptcy, the absolute priority rule
would require that shareholders not retain any interest in the com-
pany unless creditors were first paid in full. Thus, the "limited fund"
class action may serve chiefly to effect wealth transfers from a corpora-
tion's tort creditors to its shareholders. 9
4. Possible Reforms
Professor Coffee examines a variety of possible reforms, including
(1) interpreting Rule 23(a) (4) to prevent a plaintiffs' attorney from
resolving future claims on a less favorable basis than the attorney has
recently settled any significant number of present claims, thereby pre-
cluding the defendants' use of inventory settlements to induce the
attorney to represent the future claims class;10 (2) modifying the right
to opt-out for the special case of the future claimant so that it com-
mences as of the claimant's discovery of his injury;" and (3) represen-
tative plaintiff steering committees or an auction procedure for the
choice of lead counsel to improve the accountability of the counsel
selection process. Certain of these reforms may be constitutionally re-
quired by the Due Process Clause.12 More broadly, Professor Coffee
have been rejected by appellate courts. See In re School Asbestos IAtig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d
Cir. 1986); In reNorthern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982). Bankruptcy, of course, supplies an alternative means by which to prorate
creditor claims and offers more procedural protections.
9 Interestingly, in the Fibreboard "limited fund" class action, see supra note 8, the stock
price of Fibreboard has soared following the announcement of the class action settlement.
See Mass Tort Actions, A Growing Movement, Are Viwed with Mixed Emotion by Attorneys, NAT'L
LJ., Dec. 26, 1994, at C14.
10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) requires the court to find that "the represen-
tative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." This "adequacy of
representation" standard should preclude an attorney who has entered into such an inven-
tory settlement from representing the class.
11 Mass toxic torts typically have long latency periods. Thus, the point at which a
"future claims" class action is certified and the settlement approved may be decades before
a class member discovers that he or she is ill. To make the right to opt out meaningful, it
should accrue as of the moment of discovery, not as of the settlement's approval. Interest-
ingly, there is some precedent for this approach. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709,
745 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that any class member who was dissatisfied with the settlement
offer had, under the settlement, "the right to elect to have her claim settled in a trial with
all the procedural rights normally attaching to a jury trial"). In effect, this election
amounts to a delayed opt-out right. See also Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D.
Ohio 1992).
12 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) (due process entitles
class members to a right to opt out from the class); Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d
386 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1359 (1994). But see In reAgent Orange Prod.
Liab. Iltig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1437 (2d Cir. 1993) (right to opt out not required where it
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questions whether the filing of a future claims class action based only
on the fact of exposure to a toxic or dangerous product should satisfy
the "case and controversy" requirement of Article III of the U.S. Con-
stitution.' 3 Standing, he suggests, should be limited to those circum-
stances in which (1) class members are likely to be aware of their
injuries at the time of certification (such as in the defective heart valve
or breast implant cases) and (2) the class includes present and future
claimants so that at least some class members are in a position to mon-
itor the adequacy of their attorneys' representation. Finally, Professor
Coffee argues that "settlement class" actions should only be tolerated
where the same class action could be certified for purposes of trial.
This would require the court to make the same finding of "commonal-
ity" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and, in an action
certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (b) (3), the same
finding that such common issues "predominate over any questions af-
fecting only individual members"-without relying on the fairness or
adequacy of the settlement as the alleged common issue. 14 This re-
quirement would arm plaintiffs' attorneys in settlement negotiations
with the ability to go to trial.
Ultimately, the most distinctive fact about mass tort class actions,
Professor Coffee argues, is not the opportunistic behavior of the set-
tling parties, but the palpable self-interest of distinctjudges seeking to
avoid a flood of individual actions. Accordingly, the likelihood of real
reform, he suggests, depends upon convincing federal courts that
their ends do not justify the current means, and that the necessary
case load reduction can be achieved through techniques that are less
invasive of plaintiffs' rights and less costly to the appearance ofjustice.
The most important reform, he argues, may therefore be to chill "op-
portunistic" opt-outs and to reallocate all opt-outs equitably among
judicial districts and among the state and federal systems.
would be meaningless to future claimants). Professor Coffee argues that because due pro-
cess is a flexible concept, the best compromise is to extend the right to opt out until a
reasonable period after discovery of the injury.
13 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992); Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1989) (requiring "concrete injury-in-fact" as standard for Article III
standing).
14 One recent and important decision has already imposed such a requirement. See
In re General Motors Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., Nos. 94-1064, 94-1194, 94-
1195, 94-1198, 94-1202, 94-1203, 94-1207, 94-1208, 94-1219, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 8815 (3d
Cir. Apr. 17, 1995).
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